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Abstract 
This paper explains the build-up and the reversal of macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area from a 
social-model point of view. Imbalances between the core and the periphery have been attributed either to 
fundamental differences in competitiveness or to the fact that capital was flowing into low-income countries 
where returns were highest. The former hypothesis is unable to account for the decoupling of export 
performance and standard cost competitiveness indicators and can hardly fit the Irish case. The latter is weak 
on push factors or, when focused on credit demand, unable to explain why countries with similar per capita 
income levels have different external positions. Others argue that EMU is forcing under the same 
straightjacket countries with different growth models. We consider specifically differences in social rather 
than growth models, those pertaining to the distribution of income, and how these interact with financial 
liberalization. The argument is that, while the supply of credit was extensive and available for all, the 
demand for credit was stronger in unequal countries where the share of the population that was credit-
constrained prior to financial liberalization was higher than in relatively equal countries and where both 
financial openness and credit market regulation had been until then much more stringent. When the crisis 
hit, deleveraging through demand compression concerned specifically these groups, leading to current 
account deficit reversals. On the other hand, it did not necessarily affect equal countries where EMU was not 
associated with a massive relaxation of collateral constraints as in the periphery.  
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1. Introduction 
The Euro debt crisis left the euro area divided into a periphery with uncontrolled deficit 
and debt dynamics, fragile banking systems and strong wage and price growth, and a core 
with conservative public finances, relatively stable banking systems and moderate wage 
and price growth. This dichotomy was well reflected in macroeconomic imbalances: 
peripheral countries have been suffering from high current account deficits from the 
introduction of the single currency up to around 2011 when these started unwinding, while 
core countries benefited from sustained surpluses that have not gone through a symmetric 
adjustment as yet.  
There remains though fundamental disagreement over the origins of the imbalances. Some 
attribute them to differences in cost competitiveness between the core and the periphery 
that have come to light following the loss of the exchange rate as a policy instrument 
(Zemanek, Belke and Schnabel 2009; Belke and Dreger 2011). As, in accounting terms, a 
current account deficit equals net capital inflows, others have suggested that capital flows 
in the euro area represent a standard downhill flow of capital, with excessive savings 
going from the core to the periphery where relatively low capital stocks promise high 
returns to investment (Abiad et al 2009; Giavazzi and Spaventa 2010; Jaumotte and 
Sodsriwiboom 2010). The competitiveness hypothesis fails to account for the apparent 
decoupling of export performance and standard cost competitiveness indicators such as 
real effective exchange rates (REERs). Moreover, it can hardly fit the Irish case, whose 
export performance prior to the introduction of the single currency was comparable to that 
of other European Union (EU) core countries. The capital hypothesis is a good starting to 
understand why capital has been moving out of the core and into the periphery, but it is 
weak on push factors, as it focuses exclusively on credit supply. The mirror image of the 
capital hypothesis is, on the credit demand side, the idea that low-income countries engage 
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in inter-temporal consumption (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002; Fagan and Gaspar 2007, 
2008). Households in low-income countries would get indebted in the expectation of 
higher income tomorrow, which would make it possible to pay back their debt. 
Nevertheless, the capital hypothesis even if one looks at it from a credit demand side is 
incapable of explaining, for example, why countries with comparable per capita income 
level have been importing more capital than others. Moreover, it is unable to account for 
the fundamental differences in the distribution of debt-to-income across deficit and surplus 
countries, with the debt burden highest for the bottom 20 percent in the case of peripheral 
countries and high to the same extent for both the bottom 20 percent and the top 80-90 
percent in core countries.   
This paper provides an explanation of the accumulation of imbalances up to the crisis and 
their asymmetric unwinding thereafter that looks specifically at the role of inequality and 
at how it interacts with financial openness. Just like in the capital hypothesis, we assume 
that the "shock" of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) consists of full capital mobility 
rather than the loss of the exchange rate. More specifically, we argue that capital account 
openness and the ensuing large supply of credit led to stronger demand for credit in 
unequal than in equal countries just because the share of the (low-income) population that 
had been credit-constrained prior to EMU was larger in the former than in the latter. Our 
perspective is also useful to understand current account adjustment thereafter, as the crisis 
forced deleveraging onto the same portion of the population that got indebted in the 
periphery, while not necessarily impacting on income groups in the core. For the latter, in 
fact, the rise in credit supply in the mid-1990s had not been as regime-changing as in the 
periphery. Yet, exchange rate regimes matter in one respect. Before the introduction of the 
single currency, peripheral countries had all relatively soft exchange rate regimes, which 
forced them into some capital account protectionism. The same was true for domestic 
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credit market regulation, which was tighter in the periphery than in the core. Financial 
openness and credit market deregulation were thus a stronger shock to soft currency than 
to hard currency countries.  
The paper's added value can be summarized as follows. First, we focus on the effects of 
financial liberalization on participating economies by including in the analysis an 
appreciation of the factors that drive credit demand. Second, while buying into the 
literature that has explained household debt accumulation through the lenses of inter-
temporal consumption, we expand on it by accounting for individual heterogeneity in each 
country. This is an important perspective for understanding the process of deleveraging 
after the crisis insofar as indebted households that occupy the lower end of the income 
distribution are more likely to deleverage abruptly via demand compression than those 
that are at the higher end of the income distribution. Third, we find room for the exchange 
rate, but here the bulk of the argument is that the soft currency regime of many European 
countries prior to the introduction of the Euro explains why they had to defend their 
currencies through the capital account and why, in turn, financial openness since the mid-
1990s has been a greater shock here than in hard-currency countries, where the capital 
account had been relatively open throughout the 1980s. Fourth, we consider also the role 
of domestic credit market regulation; as in the case of the capital account, credit market 
deregulation since the 1990s has been more significant in the periphery than the core, 
thereby allowing capital inflows to fuel credit bubbles. Fifth, as mentioned, our approach 
is useful to understand asymmetric rebalancing. The crisis came as a financial shock 
similar for peripheral countries to the capital account shock associated with EMU but of 
opposite sign, inducing the reversal. It did not affect surplus countries for which EMU as 
such had been less of a shock.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a review of the literature on 
macroeconomic imbalances. Section 3 presents some stylized data on the possible role of 
inequality. Section 4 develops a full empirical test to assess the impact of income 
inequality levels on external positions. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Analyzing existing accounts 
There is an extensive and continuously growing literature looking at the reasons behind 
the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances in Europe since the second half of the 1990s. 
As divergences became both significant and persistent starting with the 1990s, the general 
consensus is that the monetary union itself bears an impact on this dynamics. Two 
alternative explanations are provided, one based on cross-country differences in 
competitiveness and the other on the consequences from capital mobility under EMU. 
2.1. The competitiveness hypothesis   
The competitiveness hypothesis is based on the idea that the loss of the exchange rate as a 
policy instrument brought to light underlying differences in competitiveness between the 
core and the periphery. Countries in the core were competitive already before the 
introduction of the single currency. They had hard currency regimes, which reflected the 
fact that they did not need to use the exchange rate for adjustment. On the other hand, 
countries in the periphery relied extensively on devaluation to recoup competitiveness and 
were in fact characterised by soft currency regimes. Moreover, they also failed to 
implement productivity-enhancing reforms in the 1990s (Zemanek, Belke and Schnabel 
2009; Belke and Dreger 2011). 
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Some develop an institutional argument to explain why these countries have been 
generally more competitive than the others alluding to the fact that competitiveness was in 
fact well supported by wage-setting systems that induced wage moderation in the export-
oriented sector. Carlin (2013) argues that certain wage-setting systems are self-adjusting 
because they are populated by rational forward-looking wage setters; such agents are able 
to observe cyclical conditions and adjust wage demands in ways that allow the real 
exchange rate to return to its equilibrium level. Two features make wage-setters rational 
and forward-looking. First, they should be large enough to internalise the consequences of 
their actions, which is a function of the level of wage bargaining centralization. Second, 
they should coordinate wage increases at least to some extent, with adjustment capacity 
maximised when coordination takes place via pattern-setting by the exposed sector, as the 
latter has a specific interest in job-preserving real exchange rate adjustment. Countries 
with rational and forward-looking wage setters have been better able than the others at 
delivering competitiveness improvements under EMU. 
This hypothesis has been criticised on a number of fronts. For example, Gros (2011) 
shows that unit labour costs (ULC) are poor predictors of exports. Gabrisch and Staehr 
(2014) show convincingly that rising ULC follow from capital inflows rather than being 
the cause of current account deficits in some member states. Moreover, the 
competitiveness hypothesis is unable to account for the Irish performance, whose cost 
competitiveness before EMU was comparable to that of other core EU countries.  
2.2. The capital hypothesis  
The capital hypothesis builds on the idea that macroeconomic imbalances reflect the fact 
that some countries import capital, while others export it. In this respect, the redirection of 
saving from the core to the periphery is described as a standard downhill flow of capital. 
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The opening up of the capital account together with the elimination of exchange rate risk 
made it possible for capital to move from high-income (and high-capital-stock) countries, 
where the return to investment is lowest due to decreasing returns to scale, to low-income 
(and low-capital-stock) countries, where instead the return is highest (Abiad et al 2009; 
Giavazzi and Spaventa 2010; Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboom 2010).). The symmetric 
argument, on the credit demand side, is that low-income countries that join an integrated 
economic area would borrow from outside to finance consumption in the expectation that 
they will be able to pay their debt in the future (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002; Fagan and 
Gaspar 2007, 2008). Domestic banking systems are said to have contributed to the build-
up of credit bubbles in some of the peripheral countries by providing additional credit 
(Lane and McQuade 2014.) Whether it is credit supply or demand that is at the centre of 
the analysis, the common point is nonetheless that macroeconomic imbalances originate in 
the capital account with the main shock coming from financial liberalization rather than 
from the loss of the exchange rate. Still, the credit-supply version of the capital hypothesis 
is weak on the description of push factors. These are addressed by the credit-demand 
version of the hypothesis, which t is concerned with inter-temporal consumption but the 
approach fails to explain why countries with similar relative income levels – e.g. Austria 
and Ireland – have in fact very different external positions. While building on the idea that 
financial liberalization suddenly exposed countries’ vulnerabilities, we look more closely 
into country-level features that may explain the sudden build-up of imbalances since the 
mid-1990s and their asymmetric reversal thereafter.  
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3. A social-model explanation: inequality and financial openness  
There are studies that look specifically at heterogeneity inside EMU and attribute 
imbalances to the different operation of national economic systems. For example, Hall 
(2012) suggests that the divide inside the euro area consists of a fundamental institutional 
asymmetry resting on national varieties of capitalism, as EMU is bringing under the same 
monetary straightjacket systems designed to deliver export-led growth with systems 
designed for demand-led growth. Partly in line with this approach, we focus here on a 
dimension around which European social models have been often classified namely the 
distribution of income (see, for example, Sapir 2005). Surplus and deficit countries have 
opposite equity records with a more equal distribution of income in the North, also thanks 
to wage-setting systems that are geared towards wage compression, and a more unequal 
distribution in the South with lower coverage rates – especially in Ireland - and inefficient 
fiscal redistribution tools.  
We take external imbalances to reflect a mismatch between saving and investment. The 
argument here developed is that high starting inequality is associated with the fact that a 
large cohort that had been credit constrained before financial liberalization has eventually 
easy access to credit under EMU and an incentive to get indebted given that higher future 
income would allow them to easily repay their debt. While part of the argument builds on 
already exploited inter-temporal consumption models, it differs from a standard inter-
temporal consumption framework because it introduces individual heterogeneity in each 
country. Heterogeneity matters with a view of understanding the mechanics of the 
deleveraging process during the crisis.  
In a closed economy setting, countries that suffer from a (mostly persistent) income-
distribution shock in favour of top income categories would go through a drop in 
9 
 
aggregate consumption because high-income categories have a lower propensity to 
consume than low-income groups. Other things equal, these countries will register a 
current account surplus driven by weak demand. Nevertheless, financial liberalization and 
low interest rates allow previously credit-constrained low-income groups to borrow from 
abroad to finance consumption. At the same time, high-income groups will lend the excess 
of their savings to low-income groups, but possibly also borrow themselves from abroad 
with the purpose of lending domestically, with the result that their shares in total income 
will further increase through capital gains (for a similar argument, see Kumhof et al 
2012).1 Our argument is that financial openness during the 1990s lead to strong 
consumption in unequal countries of the euro area because it was associated with the 
relaxation of collateral constraints for previously constrained low-income groups. This 
explains the build of current account imbalances also in a relatively competitive country 
such as Ireland. By contrast, financial liberalization and the immediate availability of 
cheap capital are more neutral in their effects in countries that do not suffer from high 
income inequality at the start of the period or have enjoyed relatively favourable lending 
conditions before EMU or both. Would but inequality rise in these countries for 
exogenous reasons, the expectation is that affected households would increase saving for 
precautionary reasons given they do not expect higher future income with the purchasing 
power shifting away from groups with a relatively high propensity to consume.  
Figure 1 plots the initial income inequality level in 1995 and the average current account 
balance in the subsequent period from 1995 to 2007. The evidence is indeed that more 
unequal countries have had worse external positions than more equal ones. Income 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that top earners are likely to act as intermediaries if foreign capital takes the form of 
inter- or intra-bank loans as opposed to portfolio or foreign direct investment, as the latter two may not 
necessarily require intermediaries. 
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inequality may be taken to just capture per capita income levels since the two variables are 
in fact highly correlated, yet, the empirical evidence is that the relationship between 
inequality and current account balances becomes a significant one only starting from the 
mid-1990s. 
One other important feature is the asymmetric reversal. While, over 1995-2007, relatively 
unequal countries had a median current account deficit of 3 percent of GDP and equal 
countries a surplus of about 4 percent of GDP, after 2010, the deficit of unequal countries 
had been fully reversed, while the surplus of equal countries was on average only halved 
(Figure 2). The fact that low-income had been the most leveraged prior to the crisis may 
help explain asymmetric reversal, as the crisis is likely to have forced into deleveraging 
more low-  than high-income groups, by pulling them out of the labour market.  
Exchange rates play a role in one peculiar respect. All hard-currency countries of the EU 
had relatively high levels of financial openness in the period from 1980 up to the 
introduction of the single currency because they did not need to use the exchange rate It is 
also the case that countries in the periphery in fact including Ireland had a relatively 
closed capital account prior to EMU (Figure 3). At the same time, the periphery also had 
stringent credit market regulation at home that got significantly relaxed though in the early 
1990s (Figure 4). In other words, the South of Europe was abruptly exposed to external 
financial openness and domestic credit market regulation, while the North was not.  
 
4. Empirical strategy and results 
We test our proposition on a sample of 12 euro area countries over 1995-2007. The basic 
specification is as follows: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where CA is the current account balance as a share of GDP in country i and year t. CN is 
the current account norm the current account level that should prevail on the basis of 
fundamental; it is extracted from a panel regression of current account balances on 
fundamental factors including the oil balance, the fiscal policy stance, the old-age 
dependency ratio, real GDP per capita growth, the relative income per capital level and net 
foreign assets as a percentage of GDP, where all variables are calculated as 4-year non-
overlapping averages.2 Open is openness to trade. C is measure of financial deepening 
proxied by private credit to GDP. I is a dummy for unequal countries. I*C is the 
interaction between private credit and the inequality dummy. The panel is estimated by 
random effects. Time dummies are not included.  
Table 1 reports the results. We find that is the interaction between inequality and access to 
credit that bears a negative impact on the current account. We further split the sample into 
unequal (deficit) and equal (surplus) countries to check for group-specific responses to the 
same variable. Interestingly enough, the fall in financial constraints that results in a large 
supply of credit affects external positions only in unequal countries. Openness is 
significant and positively signed only for equal countries, possibly suggesting that supply-
side factors, while not paramount in the evolution of current account deficits, may indeed 
contribute to explaining current account surpluses. Finally, the negatively signed 
coefficient on the current account norm for equal (surplus) countries indicates a departure 
from equilibrium levels.  
As a robustness check, we put our hypothesis to the test against a difference-in-difference 
framework over 1980-2007. We aim to show that an unequal distribution of income is 
                                                          
2 The methodology is taken from Salto and Turrini (2010). 
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associated with poor external positions only for countries that become part of EMU and 
are as such exposed to full capital mobility further supported by the elimination of 
exchange rate risks. The specification is as follows:  
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾𝐸𝑠 + 𝜑𝑑𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐸𝑠 ∗ 𝑑𝑡) + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where CA is the current account balance as a share of GDP in country i and period t; X is a 
factor of independent variables: i) the current account norm, as defined above; ii) real 
GDP growth; iii) openness to trade; iv) a measure of financial deepening proxied by 
private credit to GDP; v) PPP-converted per capita income relative to the US and its 
square; and vi) the standardised Gini coefficient and its square.3  
 
Table 1. Credit and inequality, random effects (1995-2007) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: CA % of GDP All Unequal Equal 
        
CA norm 0.127 2.249** -0.373* 
 
[0.843] [8.311] [-2.405] 
Unequal (dummy) 1.454 
  
 
[0.523] 
  Private credit 0.00713 -0.0328** -0.0209 
 
[0.406] [-3.022] [-1.354] 
Private credit*unequal -0.0889** 
  
 
[-4.430] 
  Openness 
 
-0.0154 0.110** 
  
[-1.191] [5.928] 
Constant 2.516 5.866** -5.172* 
 
[1.137] [3.943] [-2.479] 
    Observations 139 65 74 
Number of countries 11 5 6 
z-statistics in brackets 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Panel estimated using random effects to account for heteroskedasticity between countries and country-
specific autocorrelation of residuals. The EA sample includes all countries that participated in the first 
wave of EMU (AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES) plus Greece. 
 
                                                          
3 For a definition of variables and sources, see Appendix. 
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Table 2: Credit and inequality, a difference-in-difference approach (1980-2007) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: CA % of GDP 
          
Post 0.988+ 1.787** 1.086+ 
 
[1.797] [3.152] [1.951] 
Treatment  1.741** 2.018** 1.808** 
 
[2.999] [3.310] [3.098] 
Diff-in-diff estimator -3.409* -3.494** -3.495** 
 
[-4.941] [-4.743] [-5.024] 
CA norm 1.210** 1.166** 1.176** 
 
[11.56] [10.07] [10.75] 
Real GDP growth -0.119+ -0.0716 -0.113 
 
[-1.734] [-0.990] [-1.620] 
Openness 0.0255** 0.0221** 0.0267** 
 
[3.690] [2.981] [3.803] 
Private credit -0.0308** -0.0302** -0.0335** 
 
[-6.270] [-5.332] [-6.076] 
Gini coefficient 2.209** 
 
2.045** 
 
[6.822] 
 
[5.119] 
Gini coefficient squared -0.0296** 
 
-0.0269** 
 
[-6.641] 
 
[-4.575] 
Relative income 
 
0.0866+ 0.0289 
  
[1.681] [0.367] 
Relative income squared 
 
-0.000449 -9.51e-05 
  
[-1.134] [-0.170] 
Constant -40.12** -4.190** -39.07** 
 
[-7.053] [-2.624] [-6.772] 
    Observations 307 308 307 
R-squared 0.450 0.379 0.452 
Robust T-statistics in brackets 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Difference-in-difference method with robust and clustered standard errors. The sample includes a group of unequal 
OECD countries (Australia, Greece, Ireland, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, USA), while the treatment group is those that become member of EMU with the break set at 1995.  
 
Table 2 show the results. The coefficient on the difference-in-difference estimator is 
significant suggesting that unequal countries that joined EMU and that have been exposed 
to financial openness have had worse current accounts than other unequal countries in the 
world. Even if already included in the current account norm, real GDP growth has been 
also introduced separately to account for the possibility that it has non-normal effects by, 
for example, leading to a pro-cyclical relaxation of collateral constraints. As expected, 
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openness is associated with improved external positions, while more credit to the private 
sector deteriorates the current account. The relationship between relative income and 
current account is hump-shaped, suggesting that become richer from low income levels 
leads to a rise in aggregate saving over investment but to a fall when moving from 
medium to high-income levels. The same is found for inequality. Rising inequality 
improves external position when starting from low inequality but deteriorates it when 
starting from relatively high inequality. Interestingly enough, when both relative per capita 
income and inequality are introduced, only inequality remains significant.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has offered a social-model-based explanation of why macroeconomic 
imbalances exploded right at the inception of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
and then reversed in asymmetrical fashion during the crisis. The argument is that, in 
peripheral countries, there was a relatively large share of the population that was credit-
constrained prior to capital liberalization and that got indebted as soon as credit became 
available on the back of optimistic expectations about the future. These are also the 
countries that had been protected until then by relatively closed capital accounts to 
safeguard their soft currencies. Strict regulation vis-à-vis the outside was also 
accompanied by tight credit market regulation, which limited the scope of domestic credit 
expansion. By contrast, countries in the core were characterized by a more equitable 
distribution of income such that the portion of the population that was credit-constrained 
before the inception of EMU was in fact very modest. They also enjoyed much greater 
financial openness and looser credit market regulation than countries in the core, which 
both stemmed from the fact that their hard currency regimes allowed them to remain 
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relatively open, while also exempting them from using domestic credit policies for 
macroeconomic adjustment.  
This demand-side explanation is compatible with accounts looking at the supply-side 
drivers of current accounts, in particular with analyses that emphasize the role of wage-
setting systems. High centralization and coordination via pattern-setting, which are said to 
account for strong cost competitiveness in the core of Europe, are also associated with 
greater equality in the distribution of income just because they imply some wage 
compression.  
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Appendix  
Variable Definition Source 
Current account (CA) Current account balance (% of GDP) AMECO 
Credit market regulation The indicators included in the index for 
credit market 
freedom are: (1) private versus 
government ownership of 
banks; (2) government borrowing 
compared to private 
borrowing; and (3) interest rate controls 
and the 
magnitude of negative real interest rates if 
present. 
Fraser Institute 
Capital account openness It is a de jure measure of financial 
openness and is measured by the number 
of restrictions on cross-border financial 
transactions as reported in the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
Chinn and Ito index 
Quintile share ratio (S80/S20)  Income quintile share ratio. It is calculated 
as the ratio of total income received by the 
20 % of the population with the highest 
income (the top quintile) to that received 
by the 20 % of the population with the 
lowest income (the bottom quintile). All 
incomes are compiled as equivalised 
disposable incomes 
EUROSTAT (available only for 1995-
2012) 
Gini coefficient  Gini coefficient  Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (SWII)  
Relative income Per capita income relative to the US 
(=100) at current prices (PPP) 
Penn World Tables 
Real GDP growth Real GDP growth rate OECD 
Young dependency ratio Ratio of people younger than 15 to the 
working-age population 
WDI 
Old dependency ratio Ratio of people older than 64 to the 
working-age population 
WDI 
Government budget balance Cyclically adjusted net lending/borrowing 
of general government (% of GDP) 
AMECO 
Private credit Domestic credit to private sector (% of 
GDP) 
WDI 
Openness Sum of imports and export (% of GDP) at 
current prices 
Penn World Tables 
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Fig. 1: Initial income inequality and average current account (1995-2007), EA 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on DGECFIN's AMECO Database and Eurostat. 
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Fig. 2: Median income inequality and current accounts before and after the crisis 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on DGECFIN's AMECO Database and Eurostat. 
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Fig. 3: Capital account openness, euro area, 1980-2012 
 
Fig. 4: Credit market regulation, euro area, 1980-2012 
 
Source: Capital Account Openness (Chinn and Ito index) and Credit market regulations (Fraser Institute). 
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